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A. Securities Regulation in Germany
Securities law as a distinguished field of law did not exist in continental Europe prior 1980.
Due to the pressure to implement European directive into national law did securities eventually
emerge from the shadows. While a US securities regulation system has already been advanced
in the sixties the European system has not been able to catch up such a lead.1
I. Introduction to securities law and regulation in Germany
This paper is trying to give an overview on German securities regulation law. Securities regulation and capital markets law are used synonymously in Germany and describe the same regulatory scope.2 To introduce the topic the spotlight shall be briefly on the historic development
of securities regulation before policy goals and principles of regulation are explained. The process of rule-making, the supervision of security markets and its participants as well as the enforcement of securities law as core elements will be examined in more detail. To conclude the
topic, the regulatory response of the European legislator to the financial crisis of 2007-09 will
be outlined.
1. Regulated self-regulation of the security market
The term regulation is broad and therefore leaves room for different explanatory approaches.
One approach that also describes a function of regulation is the concept of administrative regulated self-regulation as described by the German term ‘Gewährleistungsverwaltung’: ‘meaning measures that secure functionality of a certain field of business by activating and shoring
action-guiding criteria.’3 The field of regulation regarding the capital market is a German and
European security market that describes principles and rules which target the public trade of
capital goods, for example securities, stocks, bonds et al..4 The regulation to be examined is
therefore the regulation of the market as described in § 2 V WpHG5. New developments like
the ‘lex prokon’ that target regulation regarding the ‘grey capital market’ in order to achieve
higher standards of consumer protection are beyond the scope of this paper. On the international
level, securities market law is often divided into two main subcategories: ‘regulation’ and ‘supervision’. ‘Regulation’ refers to rule-making whereas ‘supervision’ deals with the application

1

Veil, in: Veil, Europäisches Kapitalmarktrecht, 2.ed (2014), § 6 para.1.
Veil, in: European Capital Markets Law (2013), § 2, para. 2.
3
Bumke, Regulierung am Beispiel der Kapitalmärkte (2008), 108; Schmidt-Aßmann, Verwaltungsrecht in der
Informationsgesellschaft (2000), 405 (425).
4
Bumke, Regulierung am Beispiel der Kapitalmärkte (2008), 110.
5
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG, as of November 20 2015, BGBl. 2029.
2

1

of rules to specific cases.6 Security regulation is distinct from the regulation of financial markets. Security regulation targets security markets while financial regulation refers to the oversight of Banks and similar actors.
2. Securities regulation policy
The primary aim of security regulation in Germany is to secure and preserve the functionality
of capital markets. The protection of investors is considered to be ‘just a reflex’ but not a primary goal.7 Thus the task of investor protection is subordinate. The European approach to harmonize security regulation targets the protection of confidence and susceptibility to trouble by
concentrating on investor protection (disclosure) and functionality of the security market.8
3. Brief introduction to the ‘history’ of German and European Securities Regulation
In 1993 a study book about European Company Law stated that ‘the public company structure
has steadily lost importance in Germany over the last two decades. […] In Germany one hears
about the crisis of the corporation.’9 Nonetheless, securities law experienced a dynamic development due to an immense enlargement of corporate business activities and an increase in capital market products and services since the early nineties up until the bubble of the ‘new economy’ burst in 2000.10
Security regulation as one external factor of corporate governance has been in the focus of
economic policy making in almost every industrial state since that time. The core question is
how to achieve a statuary framework that both de jure and de facto promote good, responsible
and sustainable value added corporate governance?11
At the outset of the European project, the EC and the European Council claimed to be responsible for securities regulation legislation in order to accomplish the goal of one single European
market.12 The harmonization process in this field originates from the Segré-Report of 1966.
That report intended to target the coordination of stock market and prospectus law and also
effected the harmonization process and policy making of securities market law until the nineties. The original idea of a comprehensively harmonized capital market law for all member
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states and one single oversight body was abandoned after the UK entered the European stage.13
Therefore the implementation of supervisory authorities was left to the Member states. An impetus to the overhaul of German capital market law was when the SEC criticized securities
issued in Germany as being below Wall-Street-quality. Both practitioners and scientists in Germany promoted self-regulation up until this point. 14 Consequently, the legislator introduced the
second capital market promotion act, which included the BAW (Bundesaufsichtsamt für
Wertpapierhandel), a federal administration created in 1994 to monitor securities trading.15
On the European level another milestone has been the Lamfalussy-Report of 2000, which criticized the slow process of law making as the major obstacle to one European capital market
law.16 As a consequence of the reports recommendation, the EC passed the Prospectus Directive
(2001/34/EC [2003] OJ L345/64) in 2003. It again addresses important aspects towards a maximum harmonization regarding prospectus law by leaving little space for national
‘Sonderwege’.17 In the aftermath of the financial crisis severe deficits of the global financial
market system were revealed. The EC mandated a group presided by chairman de Larosière to
work out recommendations for future Regulation and oversight of European Capital Markets.18
On the Basis of the de Larosière-Report, the Commission took measures to fight systemic risks
on the financial market such as the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility.
Securities regulation law alias capital market law on a European level may be characterized by
unity and diversity from a European perspective.19 Maximum harmonization aims at the elimination of all deviations in the capital markets law on national levels whereas minimum harmonization merely requires certain minimum requirements that must be met but may be exceeded.20 Due to the process of European harmonization, German legislation on the field of
capital market regulation is closely bounded to the Community’s rules. Nonetheless, securities
regulation has always been and remains a matter for Member States.21 The milestones that
formed the statuary framework of national security law alias capital market law during the past
26 years are four legislative reforms referred to as ‘Capital Market Promotion Acts’.22 As the
name indicates, the acts primary goal is to promote Germany as a location of business in the
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field of securities. The developments on the European and German level correlate with a changing policy of financing of both mid-sized and major German companies as well as the worldwide expansion of investment banking.23 Aside the harmonization process – the ‘Europeanization’ of capital markets – structural changes forced the regulator to react. The German capital
and security market evolved from being dominated by banks to being primarily focused on
shareholder structure of external investors.24
II. Policy goals and principles of regulation
Security regulation on the national level aims at two inseparable policy goals: 1) protection and
functionality of the market and 2) protection of investors and debtors.25 The European legislator
explicitly says that he tries to reach a ‘high level of investor protection.’26 On the European level
regulation also serves as a vehicle to achieve one single European Market.27 This again has been
recently underlined by the EC.28 While investor protection and market functionality have been
considered to be policy goals aiming at an improvement of economic, political or social welfare,
these goals have subsequently developed certain principles. This transformation from policy
goals to principles is due to a process of legislative reform especially in the context of corporation law. The crucial difference between market functionality as a policy goal to its derivative
principles is that principles describe rights whereas policy goals describe the ultimate goals
those rights are intended to serve.29
1. Policy goal of capital market protection and functionality
The regulator’s task is to keep the capital market efficient and to provide for a capital market
friendly environment in the interest of the public. The interest of the public lies in the functionality and efficiency of the capital market that is to be achieved through supervision of supervisory authorities. There are three distinguishable aspects of market efficiency: allocation efficiency, operational efficiency and institutional efficiency. 30 Allocation efficiency involves the
most efficient allocation of investable capital. That is, where it is the most profitable and thus

23

Rudolf, in: Habersack/ Mülbert/ Schlitt, 2013, § 1, Rn. 66
Assmann, in: Hdb Kapitalanlagerechts (2015), § 1, para 25.
25
Hopt, Der Kapitalanlergerschutz im Recht der Banken, 52.
26
Recital 5 and 7 to Directive 2004/109/EC.
27
Kalss/ Oppitz/ Zollner, Kapitalmarktrecht, 2005, § 1, para. 17; Bumke, Regulierung am Beispiel der
Kapitalmärkte (2008), 118.
28
European Commission, EuZW, 2015, 731.
29
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, 22.
30
Recital 1 to Directive 2004/109/EC, Kalss/ Oppitz/ Zollner, 2005, § 1, para. 20; Böse, Wirtschaftsaufsicht und
Strafverfolgung, 2005, S.26.
24

4

benefits society most. For allocational efficiency, then, the legislator’s task is therefore to set
up an environment in which investors are informed and are given the opportunity to revise their
investment decisions.31 Operational efficiency involves the minimization of transaction costs.
The matter addresses the costs involved in the search for and completion of investment opportunities. Where costs cannot be eliminated, they should be borne by the cheapest cost avoider,
or the party who can most cheaply bear the costs. Institutional efficiency involves investor confidence in the market integrity and stability.32 Therefore all possible risks have to be both transparent and measurable. Regulators can achieve this through rules that require transparency,
regulate conduct and provide free access to the market.33
2. Policy goal of Investor Protection
At the center of investor protection is the investor’s investment decision. The stereotypical investor the legislator had in mind while designing the regulatory mechanism, is an individual or
entity that seeks to invest upon a rational, informed basis framework according to the rationaloptimistic market model in the theory of efficient capital markets.34
There are four major tasks to achieve investor protection. First, the regulator has to provide for
an environment where the investing party may decide rationally and upon complete information
that is available to all investors. Second, no future change that the investor could not take in
consideration should disadvantage the investor. Third, the regulator has to provide for a continuous flow of information so that an investor can revise his investment. Finally, an investor
should be able to exit investments by selling his shares at prevailing market prices.35
3. Capital Market Principles
The policy goals for securities regulation are addressed by adhering to several main principles.
The prominent principle is the nondiscrimination precept regarding every market participant.
The nondiscrimination precept requires that all investors receive the same information at the
same time. Provisions that target the nondiscrimination precept that for example may be found
in the § 83 BörseG36, § 47a AktG37. While § 47a AktG protects shareholders of the company
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the principle itself also includes the protection all participants in the market, including nonshareholders.38
Another principle is market integrity. Market integrity requires an ongoing process to secure
investor confidence in the market. Regulation in this field concentrates on setting up requirements for financial intermediaries as well as duties, obligations and limitations relating to activities such as insider trading, information obligations or market manipulation.39 The 1966
Segré-Report already discussed transparency as a key principle of securities regulation.40 The
Transparency Guideline leaves no doubt that a ‘prompt and fair disclosure of information to the
public’ must be provided.41 ‘The disclosure of accurate, comprehensive and timely information
about security issuers builds sustained investor confidence and allows an informed assessment
of their business performance and assets. This enhances both investor protection and market
efficiency.’42 In order to secure market efficiency, the regulator supports the free market and
regulates through disclosure provisions to remove information asymmetries.43
III. Rule-making, supervision and enforcement
1. Rule-making
Securities regulation law is subject to both European and national legislation. The latter is restricted to provisions regarding regulated markets.44 National supervisory authorities play an
important role in all three fields: rule-making, supervision and enforcement, for example in
Germany the BaFin, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority.
a) Rule-making on a European level
In the center of European legislation is the so-called Lamfalussy Process that was introduced in
2002. The idea behind “Lamfalussy” is to achieve an efficient, flexible and faster legislation for
securities regulation.45 The process is divided into four levels of rule-making. On level one
framework directives, which are broad enough to allow flexible application of the legislation
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during the later stages but specific enough to give the implementing bodies direction, are created. The original idea was to have frameworks with only basic principles to be concretized on
consecutive level two and three.46 On level two, the framework directives are concretized
through regulations and directives of the commission. In this stage the Commission also adopts
delegated acts that are drafted by the European Supervisory Body the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA).47 ESMA is an independent EU Authority with three objectives:
investor protection, orderly markets and financial stability. The authority assesses risks to investors, markets and financial stability. Specifically, it completes a single rulebook for EU financial markets, promotes supervisory convergence and directly supervises specific financial
entities. Supervisory convergence is promoted to ensure a ‘level playing field of high quality
regulation and supervision without regulatory arbitrage or race to the bottom.’48 On Level three
of the Lamfalussy process, ESMA enacts Guidelines and Recommendations for a Pan-European
consistent interpretation of securities regulation law. ESMA recommendations and guidelines
are non-binding. Nonetheless, their significance liesin its importance as an interpretation tool
for all European regulators and market participants.49 On Level four, ESMA evaluates and monitors the national enforcements of level one and level two rules on capital markets law. If national legislators do not comply with the Community’s rules the Commission may commence
an infringement proceeding against the Member State.50
b) Rule-making on a national level
European directives must be implemented by the Member States, hence member state law is
derivative of primarily European Law.51 National provisions may address further aspects and
interpret directives into more concrete terms, especially regarding means of enforcement. The
Member states have, disregarding rules of the concept of maximum harmonization, a large degree of flexibility in the implementation of the directives. Thus national legislators may orientate their legislation according to national concepts.52
aa) Sources of German securities regulation law
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The Stock Exchange Act (BörsG), the Securities Trading Act (WpHG), the Securities Prospectus Act (WpPG53) and the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (WpÜG54) are the main
sources of federal securities law in Germany that is passed by the federal legislator. Most important regarding oversight of capital markets and enforcement of its governing rules is the
Securities and Trading Act, which regulates the scope of function and the duties of the German
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). These are supplemented by regulations.55 Additionally, WpHG is supplemented by eight ordinances.
bb) German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)
Aside from the national legislator and the Department of Treasury (Bundesministerium der Finanzen), the BaFin, as an executive authority, has a restricted power of rule-making while its
primary task is in the field of securities law enforcement.
(1) Mission and general policy
The BaFin is financed through an apportionment procedure of Parties that participate in the
capital markets according to § 16 I FinDAG56 as well as fees and charges according to § 15
FinDAG. In return, the government administration supervises the market in the best interest of
the general public. The service of the BaFin is therefore a general legal infrastructure service
that operates to maintain market mechanisms and to secure an orderly commerce, both of which
are in the interests of the consumer .57 The BaFin itself states that its responsibility is to monitor
listed companies and market participants to ensure that they comply with various regulations
under the WpHG. Individual stock exchanges are not subject to the supervision authority of
BaFin.58 Its task according to the WpHG is also danger defense § 4 I, II) as a “prophylaxis”
against violation of the WpHG.59
(2) Institutional structure
The BaFin is an institution under federal government control and is governed by the authority
of the Department of Treasury according to § 1 I 1 FinDAG. Its concept is in the tradition and
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historic context of the founding of the British FSA and other European regulation authorities in
the nineties a single supervisory system.60 Within the organization of the BaFin as a single supervisory authority exist separate supervisory branches in charge of banks, insurance companies and capital markets.61 Strictly separated from the BaFin is the stock market supervision.
The reason for the separation is a question of competence between the federal legislation and
state legislation. Capital market law is subject to federal law while stock market law is subject
to state law according to Art. 74 I 11 GG62. Since 2011, the European Supervisory body ESMA
monitors the BaFin’s monitoring.
(3) Rule making power
The BaFin has certain fields in which it can enact ordinances and guidelines. Aside from this
power to legislate it can act trough informal administrative means, as well as administrative
acts (gm. § 35 I VwVfG63).
(a) Ordinances and guidelines
The BaFin has no general right to enact ordinances under the WpHG. Nonetheless, it has the
right to enact certain ordinances such as those regarding cooperations with foreign supervisory
authorities, according to § 7 VIII WpHG, or publication and information about insider information, according to § 15 VII WpHG, among other fields. Since the BaFin is not entitled to
enact ordinances the Department of Treasury delegates its legislative power to the supervisory
authority.64 According to §§ 29, 35 IV WpHG the BaFin may enact guidelines. The nature of
guidelines is subject to debate and is considered to be either a legal rule similar to an ordinance,
on one hand, or, on the other hand, as an interpretation of rules with no external regulatory
effect. The predominant opinion currently considers guidelines to be internal administration
acts with no external regulatory effect that actualizes regulation.65 Nonetheless, guidelines may
have an impact outside the administration according to Art. 3 I GG and the principle of selfcommitment (Selbstbindung).66
(b) Informal acts of administration
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A tendency that may be observed not only in the field of regulation law but also in other fields
of administrative behavior in Germany is a shift from so called legal-act-centering (‘Rechtsaktzentrierung’) towards behaviour-centering (‘Verhaltenszentrierung’).67 By publishing its administrative actions, the BaFin sets – even though they are not legally binding - abstract generalized factual standards of behavior for those that are subject to BaFin supervision.68 Different
actions are considered to be an informal act of administration. These include casual communiques, information sheets (‘Rundschreiben’), announcements, information regarding frequently asked questions (FAQ) on BaFin’s Website as well as the collection of assisting interpretation guidelines.69 The German Federal High Court of Justice considers those informal acts
just as administrative regulations for implementing standards.70 Considering that informal acts
are legally non-binding, the complex process of consultation between BaFin and market participant’s information sheets and announcements are designed is remarkable.71 This process underlines its factual rule-making character.
The issuer guideline is one of the most important informal acts. It is a collection of assisting
interpretation regarding the Securities Trading Act that is, in its latest version, only available in
German.72 It was designed to promote legal certainty as well as predictably of legal decisions
regarding Supervision for national and international issuers.73 Informal acts of administration
of the BaFin are non-binding and are not legal acts with an external regulatory effect.74 Like
guidelines, informal acts may have an external regulatory impact according to Art. 3 I GG if
requirements of the administrative principle of self-commitment are (‘Selbstbindung’).75 Therefore administrative provisions are in principle subject and not standard to judicial control.76 This
is proven by the fact that civil courts have ruled inconsistent with BaFin administrative provisions.77 In conclusion, it may be said that the BaFin possesses certain expertise and is neutral
regarding legal questions on the field of securities regulation since its mandate is bound to the
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public interest; hence market participants shall be able to rely on informal acts of the BaFin that
are available to the public and hereby created good faith is worthy of protection.78
(c) General decree
What should be considered a means of enforcement instead is also used as a form of action for
rule-making. General decrees may be based upon the sweeping clause of § 4 I 3 WpHG resp §
4 II 2 WpHG.79 General decrees, in contrast to the standard legal act of § 35 VwVfG, target the
general public, not an individual addressee, but do target a specific issue.80 A prime example is
the prohibition of uncovered short sales and the prohibition of credit default swaps. The BaFin
enacted these general decrees at the peaks of the financial crisis in order to protect to stability
of financial markets.
c) Coexisting rule makers in a federal system
This examination has shown that on a national level, aside from the legislator, the executive
body of the BaFin, as a single supervisory authority, has the power of executive rule-making
with its particular ability to act via informal acts. Supervision and rule-making are both bound
to the public interest respectively the functionality and stability of capital markets. From a European perspective, it is obvious that legislative actions on the field of securities regulation
taken in Brussels trigger a cascade of reactions in the Member states that eventually end at the
BaFin, where it has to be concretized and enforced while on a horizontal level the BaFin must
communicate with other European Supervisory Authorities as well as the ESMA to achieve one
single European market. At the same time, Germany has its own capital markets law that deviates from the European directives. Thus, the phenomenon of two coexisting regimes of securities regulation is a peculiarity of European Securities Law.81 This development is intentional
and is not considered to be an obstacle of the realization of one single European capital market.82
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2. Supervision and Monitoring
Regulation is operated through supervision, which is a “hands on business.83” Supervision from
an ex-ante perspective is the first line of defense against a destabilization of the market.84 Another important actor on the field of securities regulation is the supervision of stock markets.
The supervision of stock markets is subject to the supervision of the stock exchange administration, the stock exchange supervision of the states (such as Hessia), and the the BaFin. Every
stock exchange has to install a so called trading monitoring department (‘Handelsüberwachungsstelle’ abb. ‘HÜSt’) according to § 7 I 1 Stock Market Code (BörsG). The HÜSt is an
organ of the stock exchange.85 Its task in the framework of stock exchange self-administration
is to monitor the trading at the stock exchange and as well as the execution of transactions. The
states are in charge of the supervision of stock exchanges. The idea behind the installation of
the HÜSt was to meet international standards.86 Market participants, especially investors, may
contact the HÜSt in order to report irregularities in the process of price determination via (e-)
mail or telephone.87
The HÜSt has the duty to record and analyze the stock exchange data and to conduct investigations if necessary according to § 7 I BörsG. In case HÜSt investigates facts that suggest that the
exchange bylaws or rules have been violated in the conduct of a market transaction at the exchange, the HÜSt has to report to the stock exchange supervision authority of the particular
state.88 Notably, the intention of the implementation of the Authority of the HÜSt is exclusively
to protect the functionality of the stock exchange while investor protection is a reflex.89
The stock exchange supervision authority’s task is to monitor the exchanges - especially the
HÜSt - to ensure that they comply with their bylaws, to ensure that market participants and
issuers comply with exchange rules and that the holding of the stock exchange complies with
its duty to conduct business properly.90
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More important on the field of supervision is the BaFin. Its are stated in the WpHG. These tasks
are to monitor deals with insider information in order to enforce the prohibition of insider dealing according to § 14 WpHG, to monitor the duty of notification (ad-hoc disclosure) according
to § 15 WpHG as well as according to §§ 21, 26 WpHG, to monitor the compliance of market
participants with the prohibition of market manipulation, to monitor compliance with reporting
requirements and the rules of conduct according to §§ 31 – 35 WpHG as well as monitor Markets with financial instruments that originated outside Germany. 91
Disclosure requirements as an instrument of securities regulation serve as a mean for investor
protection. In the context of the financial crisis its importance has been decreasing due to market-structural, product orientated regulation as well as regulation targeting distributors of products respectively the institutions. Disclosure covers a wide range from disclosure regarding
sales and distribution, event-driven disclosure so called Ad-hoc-disclosure as well as current
reporting disclosure. Other requirements target disclosure of certain transactions in regard to
shareholding in order to prevent stalking of a corporation thus strengthen the German financial
center.92
Other supervision powers derive from the WpPG, which focuses on fairness and transparency
of takeovers for all investors according to § 21 WpPG or the KAAG, according to which BaFin
has the competence to supervise collective fiduciaries.93
The BaFin is also in charge of the supervision of takeovers and tender offers according to the
WpÜG. Insider dealing is prevented according to § 14 WpHG by statutory disclosure requirements. Not only are primary insiders given insider status (management, supervisory board
members) but also secondary insiders.94 Ad-hoc disclosure is designed to create a high level of
market efficiency.95 The duty to publish facts regarding matters of business or corporate development have to be published without delay. On this basis investors may claim compensation in
case of a breach of the duty of ad- hoc disclosure.96 The idea behind the prohibition of directors’
dealing is to increase transparency and market integrity.97 The WpHG also prohibits market
manipulation referring to price manipulation through the distribution of false or the withholding
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of information.98 The only relevance is whether one has the intent to influence the market price
but no need to demonstrate intent to defraud.99
3. Enforcement
Government enforces securities law using a combination of three enforcement branches: administrative, which includes both preventative means and repressive means, criminal and private securities law enforcement.
a) Preventive administrative securities regulation enforcement
Federal supervision through the BaFin is the most effective mean to supervise and enforce capital ‘market law’.100 In order to efficiently react to deficits in the field of the capital market, the
BaFin has a variety powers. § 4 III WpHG is the sweeping clause according to which the BaFin
may gather information from even unsuspicious persons. The BaFin may cite those affected
and interrogate them.101 Furthermore, the BaFin has the power to investigate after a suspicion
of violation of its governing law. BaFin analyzes data on all securities transactions in the trading
market and reacts in case of rapid price movements or other suspect occurrences.102 The acquisition of information is limited by the principle of proportionality and the obligation of confidentiality.103 According to the § 4 I 3 WpHG the BaFin may issue orders that are appropriate to
target or prevent deficits or damages according to § 4 II 1 WpHG and to enforce securities law.
The definition of “deficit” is considered to be closely related to the definition of ‘danger’ in
administrative law.104 BaFin may also prescribe law-abiding behavior to entities that are subject
to supervision, for example according to § 36 b WpHG.105
Since 2015 BaFin may also publish measures taken by it in response to violations of the Capital
Investment Act in order to encounter concerns in regard to investor protection and mayfurthermore prohibit specific market participants for certain financial practices.106.
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These measures may be enforced through administrative foreclosure such as execution by substitution and the charge of fines according to §§ 10, 11 VwVG107. In addition, the BaFin may
execute duties of market participants in substitution of the person or company responsible.108
Another preventive power is stated in § 4a WpHG. The BaFin may “issue orders that are appropriate and necessary to eliminate or prevent undesirable developments that may be detrimental to the stability of financial markets or undermine confidence in the proper functioning
of financial markets.” In order to achieve the policy goal of consumer protection, BaFin may
prohibit or restrict the trade of certain products according to § 4b WpHG.109 In principle, §§ 4,
4a WpHG contain sweeping clauses meaning that they apply subsidiary. After the 2005 Investor
Protection Improvement Act, many special authorizations were eliminated and the general
clauses are the administrative regulation basis.110 The affected companies and individuals may
challenge decisions of the BaFin and may file suit in the recourse to the administrative courts.
Courts do not act as sanctioners but as a level of jurisdiction for legal protection to those that
are subject of BaFin supervision and enforcement powers.
b) Repressive administrative means and criminal situs
The BaFin, on the other hand, also has the competence not only to act preventively but to act
repressively according to § 40 WpHG, § 36 I 1 OWiG111. Legal violations according to § 39
WpHG may be punished according to § 65 OWiG. Therefore, the BaFin has a double role and
is motivated by the reason of factual connection.112 In this context the BaFin has to consider the
“prohibition of role reversal”, meaning that criminal procedural rights may not be bypassed.113
Those subject to BaFin’s supervision may face fines up to an amount of EUR 1.000.000 and it
may even exceed this cutoff in case the economic advantage of a breach of law or obligations
exceeds the amount of EUR 1.000.000 according to § 17 IV OWiG. The opportunity to compound does not exist. Both legal entities as well as individuals may face fines. A “Deal” known
from § 257 c STPO114 does not apply outside the criminal trial and is therefore not to be used in
order to settle legal disputes.
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Based on 2013/50/EU, Abl. EU L 294/13 Germany must reform its sanctioning regime in order
harmonize the regimes on a European level. The European legislator set up criteria that eventually defined the amount of a fine including the severity and duration of the violation as well
as the degree of responsibility of the individual, financial capability of the individual, the cooperativeness of the individual and a possible a history of prior violations. Fines will be considerably higher compared to the status quo in Germany. Another crucial sanction will be the
introduction of fines that are related to corporation’s sales and may be as high as 15% of annual
sales.115
Also the fees that a subject to investigation has to pay in order to cover BaFin’s expenses may
be considered as a type of sanction.116 Another considerable sanction is “shaming.” Information
the BaFin collects about its supervised entities are protected according to § 8 WpHG as well as
according to Art. 12 and 14 GG. An entity may not be worthy of protection regarding sensible
information in case criminal offenses or breaches of administrative regulative law.117 The requirements are those of the ‘corporate shaming’ according to § 60b KWG118, § 40b WpHG.119
The institute of corporate shaming alias […] censure will change due to European legislation.
Sanctions will be published as a means of general-prevention. 120
In addition, the BaFin cooperates directly with prosecution authorities and criminal courts.
The WpHG also provides, for severe offenses, sanctions of the criminal law according to § 38
WpHG in regard to insider trading. Due to European legislation both primary and secondary
insiders will face criminal prosecution. Also, the punishment of market manipulation will be
similar to the punishment of attempted of insider trading.121 Nonetheless, criminal prosecution
is a competence exclusively reserved to the prosecution authority.122 The BaFin is nonetheless
involved in the process of criminal prosecution, must be informed about the opening of the trial
and must be officially heard before the trial § 40a WpHG.
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c) Private enforcement
German securities law also provides for private enforcement as another external regulation
mechanism for good corporate governance. Civil liability for example has the potential and task
to complement supervisory action and to a certain degree substitute for.123 Investors may sue
the issuer of securities in case of a breach of duty regarding the prospectus according to §§ 3235 WpPG may bring a derivative suit or a direct suit against a corporation.124 Derivative suits
are rarely used due to lack of attractiveness for an investor.125 Direct suits, on the other hand,
may be used against corporations to enforce liability in case of a violation of disclosure requirements. However due to the expenses that accompany a direct suit compared to the possible
economic benefit in case the court decides in favor of the suing party. Thus private enforcement
of disclosure requirements bears no attractiveness and furthermore due to ‘rational apathy’.126
Nonetheless investor protection is considered to be an aim of public supervisory and enforcement action.127
On a procedural level Germany therefore created the so called Capital Markets Model Procedure Act in 2005 (Kapitalanleger – Musterverfahrensgesetz, KapMuG128). It provides - comparable to the U.S. class action - a procedural tool to enforce claims of a large number of investors
more effectively by bringing a collective suit to court,129 although it contradicts the basic idea
of civil procedural law that is based upon a two party concept. So far its results are not convincing and it may be said that on the field of the KapMuG reform is necessary.130 Private enforcement is also regarded a key factor in the context of market manipulation; courts dealt with the
question whether § 20 a WpHG is a protective law according to § 823 II BGB131 (German civil
code); so far courts ruled in the IKB Industriebank AG case that § 20 a WpHG is not a protective
law.132 In other cases courts ruled in favor of investors and the members of the management
were held liable because of a breach of duty regarding the notification according to § 826 BGB
iVm § 15 WpHG i.e. case Infomatec, Comraod I-VIII, et.al..133 Other aspects of private enforcement of security regulation may be found in § 37b, 37c WpHG; based upon these sections
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investors may claim compensations in case an entity did not comply according to the governing
rule regarding transparency.134
IV. Aftermath of the 2008 crisis and its effects on securities regulation
In the Aftermath of the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis a lack of regulation has been identified.
Subsequently both national and the European legislator started to close gaps on the field of
regulation. The transformation is institutional and substantial.135
From a more general perspective question arose in the post-crisis era about the social utility of
markets as well as the value of untrammeled innovation. Moreover, the extent of regulation was
questioned, so was the control of levels of financial developments.136 Regarding institutional
reform three new European supervisory authorities were introduced and a complex institutional
arrangement of national and European authorities with different tasks and scopes has been installed. The reform agenda is concerned with the question how to achieve optimal supervisory
organizations with the policy goal of pan-EU market stability.137 The crisis lead to the adoption
of retail market reforms targeting for example distribution regulation, disclosure, product intervention, etc. The new approach may be characterized as interventionist.138
The European legislator also rethought his picture of an investor has shifted from a rationaloptimistic market model towards a more paternalistic model.139
In this complex supra-national regulatory system Member States of the European Union are
collectively challenged. While on a national level regulatory authorities may only see fragments
of a broader picture, the European Commission as the principle overseer with extensive bureaucratic competencies may shape the regulatory system according to its own preferences.140
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INTRODUCTION
Securities and financial regulation and enforcement in the US is composed of an alphabetsoup of regulatory institutions and a myriad of laws, rules, regulations, and interpretations by
both courts and regulatory agencies. Overall, the financial industry is regulated by over ten
federal, state, and industry regulatory bodies.141 The primary overarching philosophy is based
on the precept that “light is the best disinfectant” companies are primarily required to ensure
that they adequately disclose the financial state of the company.142
Prior to the Great Depression, US Federal Securities law operated on a laissez faire basis,
and most of the regulation was created by the states. The financial regulatory environment was
likewise characterized by this hands-off philosophy, although the crash of [1907] had provided
the impetus for the creation of the Federal Reserve. 143
The Great Depression of the 1930’s144 provided the impetus for enhanced securities
regulation by the Federal Government. Understandably, almost every single regulatory
overhaul of the financial sector occurred in the wake of a financial crisis.
The two bulwarks of US Securities Law that were created in response to the Great Depression
are the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934. Generally, the Securities Act
relates to the original issuance of securities by companies whereas the Exchange Act relates to
the trading of registered securities in the secondary market. The purpose of both are to promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation, as well as to ensure the public interest and the
interest of investors, is protected.
Since then, these Acts have been amended. The most notable periods of altered financial
regulation occurred after the dot-com boom of the early 2000’s, with the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and after the financial crisis of 2008, with the enactment of Dodd-Frank
Act.
Institutionally, the Great Depression provided the impetus for the creation of the SEC and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
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INSTITUTIONAL PLAYERS
Given the breadth of the US securities and financial regulatory system, it is beneficial to
give a brief description of the primary institutional players that impact both the rule making
process, the enforcement process, and that effect the overall regulatory environment. Although
some of these institutions are not the primary focus of this Paper, they all impact the overall
regulatory environment of the US financial system.
Security Exchange Commission
With over 3500 employees, the SEC is a relatively large financial regulatory power, even
accounting for the size of the US capital market. Its headquarters are located in Washington,
D.C. and has 11 regional offices. 5 Commissioners with staggered five year terms are appointed
by the president, who also appoints one of those 5 as Chairman of the Commission. The
staggered nature of the terms is designed to ensure institutional stability. A requirement that no
more than 3 may serve in the same political party attempts to ensure bipartisanship.145
There are 5 divisions of the SEC: Corporate Finance, Investment Management, Enforcement,
Trading and Markets, and Economic and Risk Analysis. Moreover, the 2012 Dodd Frank Act
created 5 specialized units to cover areas of particular concern.
The foundational authority for all SEC regulation and enforcement is statutory. There are
eight statutes that grant the SEC its powers, the two most important of which are the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act.146 The SEC creates Rules regarding securities issuance and reporting
requirements, proxy solicitation, and takeover procedures. Additionally, the SEC has
supervisory and regulatory authority over FINRA, the Self Regulating Organization. Since the
Credit Rating Agencies Reform Act (2006) the SEC also has some regulatory powers over
credit rating agencies.
Its stated mission is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,
and facilitate capital formation.”147
Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve was created in 1913 with the dual mandate of maximizing employment
while stabilizing prices, doing so through its open market operations (the buying and selling of
US government bonds in order to affect interest rates and the overall speed of economic
145
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growth). Since its inception its powers have been greatly enhanced and in 2009 it was given
authority to regulate the conduct of banks as well as other important financial institutions.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures a fixed amount of bank
deposits. As the insurer, it has special examination powers to examine and determine the
condition of the banks it insures. It also aids in planning the resolution of financial institutions
and, in the event of failure of an insured institution, will operate it in receivership to maximize
the recovery resulting from the disposition of the institutions assets and minimize the burden to
the taxpayer.148
Self Regulatory Organizations
The Exchange Act contemplated that much of the enforcement of SEC Rules be done
through Self-Regulatory organizations. Initially, and especially before the Great Depression,
these entities were almost entirely self-run and voluntary. Now, however, they are more fully
integrated into the federal regulatory scheme and are subject to SEC supervision.149 The
Exchange Act mandates that the SEC approve the rules and listing requirements of all of the
Exchanges, albeit that those regulations mandated by the SEC must be in accordance with their
statutory mandate.150 The enforcement relating to the broker-dealer industry, specifically, has
largely been left to SRO’s. Until 2007, this was done largely through the rulemaking provisions
of the NASD and the NYSE, but in 2007 the enforcement arms of each were consolidated under
the merged entity now called the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).151
FINRA’s stated goals are to provide rules and enforcement to ensure compliance and also
to ensure market transparency and to educate investors. FINRA supervises the adherence to a
voluntary code of ethics and also engages in the resolution of conflicts between its members
and issuers.152 That said, critics have been skeptical of the efficacy of industry self-regulation
and Congress has not granted SRO’s much power outside of the broker-dealer relationship.153
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FINRA is now the self-proclaimed “leading non-governmental regulator for all securities
firms doing business with the US public.” This seemingly schizophrenic aspect of US securities
law reflects a fundamental goal of encouraging the formation of voluntary self-policing with a
regulatory backdrop to ensure it actually works. While many question the efficacy of such
SRO’s, Congress recognizes that the elimination of FINRA and the subjugation of its duties to
the SEC would require massive resource expenditures, something that is not likely to happen
soon.154
Courts have made clear that SRO status is entirely derivative and that the SEC has full
legal authority to review and correct the SRO decisions. The D.C. Circuit has called FINRA’s
predecessor, the NASD, a “quasi-governmental agency, with express statutory authority to
adjudicate actions against members who are accused of illegal securities practices and to
sanction members found to have violated the Exchange Act or [SEC] regulations issued
pursuant thereto.”155 Finally, the SEC can itself sanction FINRA and other SRO’s, which would
be particularly harmful towards these regulatory bodies since membership is voluntary and
benefits of membership are based on reputational perception of the body by the public.156
In addition to levying fines against its members, FINRA also refers cases to the SEC for
further investigation.157
§15A of the Exchange Act allows for the establishment of National Security Associations
as long as they meet the statutory requirements as well as other rules prescribed by the SEC.158
Among these requirements are that they have a “fair procedure” for the discipline of its
members. FINRA disciplinary decisions are subject to review on several levels. First, the
National Adjudicatory Council (NAC) may hear an appeal. The NAC’s decision is considered
final unless the Board of Governors of FINRA decides to review it.159 Second, the entity subject
to supervision can appeal the decision to the SEC, which will review it De Novo (as if no trial
had been previously held).160 Even if the SEC finds that a violation occurred, the statute
indicates that, out of the interest of investors and the public interest, the SEC can mitigate or
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even cancel the punishment if it deems that the punishment “imposes any burden on competition
not necessary or appropriate. . .” or is “oppressive.”161
Commodities Futures Trading Commission
Created in 1936 (renamed and restructured from Commodity Exchange Commission in
1974) to regulate commodity futures and option contracts, the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) eventually held regulatory power Over-the-Counter (that is, nonexchange-traded) derivatives. That said, due to an increased skepticism of regulation at the end
of the 20th century and the widespread belief that derivatives were inherently beneficial, the
CFTC began assuring banks that it would not require them to be traded on their exchange.
Finally, under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, many derivatives were excluded
from regulation.162 The 2008 crisis, and derivatives role in it, provided the impetus for an
expansion of powers of the CFTC and it now regulates non-security based swaps such as
interest rate swaps and credit default swaps.163
Department of Justice
The department of Justice prosecutes any criminal sanctions related to securities law.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.
Created by the Sarbanes Oxley Act, the Public Company Oversight Board is arguably in
between an SRO and a government agency.164 It oversees audits of public companies and other
issuers. Since 2010, it also oversees audits of broker-dealers and compliance reports filed
pursuant to federal securities laws. Rules must be approved by SEC.
Treasury
The US Treasury Department the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which
regulates banks chartered by it, is a Bureau of Treasury.165
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RELEVANT SECURITIES ACTS
As noted above, there are 6 Acts which grant the SEC its rule making power in addition
to the Securities and Exchange Acts. They are:
Trust Indenture Act of 1939
Requires minimum standards that must be met for the sale of bond issues.
Investment Company Act of 1940
Provides for registration and regulation of investment companies, which are companies
engaged primarily in investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities and was designed to
minimize the conflicts of interests that can arise in these situations.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940;
Regulates the registration, conduct, and reporting requirements of investment advisers,
who are required to register with the SEC.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in response to several high profile bankruptcies that
many felt highlighted the inadequacy of American corporate law and dramatically enhanced the
SEC’s power. It has been named a “smorgasbord” of regulatory reform. Importantly, it created
the PCAOB and also enhanced the enforcement powers of the SEC, attempting to direct
enforcement towards more criminal prosecution.166 Additionally, it increased auditing
requirements, in part by requiring audit certification of internal management controls.167
Significantly, it included a ‘clawback’ provision that could retroactively require the return of
bonus, or equity based compensation plan, from executives in the event of a negative accounting
restatement as a result of misconduct that caused material noncompliance with reporting
requirements.168
Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
Enacted in response to the 2008 economic crisis, the primary purposes of Dodd Frank are
to limit the risks posed by the shadow banking system and to limit the damage caused by a
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failure of a large financial institution.169 It increased regulation of large banks, increased the
authority of the federal reserve, and increased the regulation of derivatives by requiring them
to be cleared and traded on an exchange.170
Jumpstart our Business Startups Act of 2012.
Enacted during the sluggish economic years after the 2008 crisis, the JOBS Act intended
to remove some regulatory burdens, many of which had been created by SOX, from emerging
growth companies.171
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STATE LAW
Prior to the Great Depression, each state had its own statutes designed to protect the public
from “speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of ‘blue sky.’”172 As
noted above, both of the Acts promulgated in response to the Great Depression substantially
increased federal regulation of securities that crossed interstate lines. The US Constitution
explicitly dictates that federal laws can preempt those of the states.173 Given that Congress has
authority to regulate interstate commerce, there is little doubt that the federal government can
effectively eliminate the importance of state corporate law. Although state laws regarding
fiduciary duty do carry substantial importance since the federal government has not decided to
preempt state law on those matters, it seems accepted that this fact is a result of historical
tradition and not required by the constitution. For instance, Congress did greatly enhance the
SEC’s power to regulate the internal affairs of a corporation with the passing of the Sarbane’s
Oxley Act.
That said, considerable importance must be given to state laws regarding the fiduciary
duties of corporate directors, most notably those of the laws of Delaware, in which over 60%
of publicly traded companies are incorporated.174 With Respect to securities law specifically, in
1996 the Federal Government explicitly preempted any state laws by passing the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act which required state registration of securities that are
‘covered’ under the law, significantly reducing the power of states to affect the behavior of
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companies. Since the securities covered under the law include those listed on National
Exchanges, securities law for most US companies (or, at least the most important) are dictated
by the federal legislation.175 A full description of the state and federal distinctions between both
US corporate law and securities law is beyond the scope of this paper. As such, even though
states can effectuate some regulation on securities, the Federal Government preemption of state
securities law for companies listed on a national exchange requires that the article primarily
focus on the Federal laws and the rules promulgated by the SEC.
FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Rule Making
Each statute confers upon the SEC broad responsibilities. That is, Congress passes a law,
such as the Exchange Act, directing the SEC to implement some regulatory plan. As the laws
are broadly drafted, The SEC, as an administrative body, has the considerable ability to develop
the specific rules that implement the statutory plan, or, as each statute states: “adopt whatever
rules and regulations may be necessary to carry out its statutory functions.”
As a process, for an important, complex or controversial issue the SEC will initially begin the
rule-making process by issuing a Concept Release. This Concept Release will outline the
pertinent issue involved, a number of alternative potential approaches, and elaborate upon the
costs and benefits of each approach. The public will have the opportunity to provide comment
regarding the issue, and the public’s comments should inform the SEC’s final decision. These
comments are then used to inform the SEC’s decision.
After reviewing public feedback from any previously issued “concept Release” the SEC
will publish a Rule Proposal for public notice and further comment. Public comments will be
accepted generally for 30-60 days. As the name suggests, a Rule proposal is only a proposal as
to the precise contours of the final Rule, but it does include discussion regarding the problem
that the Rule tries to solve to provide further context on which the public can elaborate. After
any amendments or finalizations are made to the Proposal, a final Rule will be proposed to the
Commission and, if approved, adopted as an official Rule governing the Securities Industry
with the full force of law. In rare circumstances, the Rule can be subject to Congressional
review, during which time it may be vetoed if it does not comply with the SEC’s authority under
the statute.
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The SEC will make additional public pronouncements that, though they do not carry the
full force of law, provide clarification as to how the laws and regulations ought to be interpreted.
Among these non-binding but persuasive pronouncements are interpretive releases, SEC policy
Statements, and SEC Staff interpretations.176 Although these do not have the force of law, they
are directed for the benefit of corporate planners and are followed by supervised entities. This
fact highlights the SEC’s role as an industry standard setter in addition to its legal power as a
regulatory body. Additionally, the SEC will, upon request by individuals, entities or attorneys
seeking advice on whether a particular course of action is in violation of SEC rules, issue
recommendations that the SEC take no enforcement action regarding the conduct. These ‘No
Action’ letters do not technically bind the commission to actually refrain from taking action,
but, as a practical matter, the Commission will be extremely hesitant to disregard them.177
Furthermore, the Commission can respond more precisely to individual requests and issue
exemptive orders.
All of the Rules and policy pronouncements may also be amended in the future, as a result
of fundamental changes in the capital market situations or as the result of a fundamental
philosophical shift of the party that controls the institution on how strict SEC Rules should be.
Duties/Overarching responsibility
As noted above, the bulwarks of US securities laws are the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act. The two work in tandem, with the Securities Act designed to regulate the
original issuance of securities by a company (the issuer) to the public and the Exchange Act
regulating the secondary trading of those securities on the market. As such, most, if not all,
large publicly traded companies, and their employees, must abide by the regulations set forth
in both Acts, in addition to the Rules promulgated by the SEC pursuant to each.
Securities Act
Federal law requires disclosure in the contexts of securities offerings, takeovers, annual
and quarterly reporting, and proxy solicitation for annual meetings of shareholders, as well as
fraud related to those activities.178
The Securities Act regulates the disclosure related to original securities offerings. Its
disclosure philosophy is aptly characterized by the SEC website, which indicates that it is called
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the “Truth in Securities Law”, with the two basic goals of requiring that investors receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale;
and prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.179
Generally, the securities Act requires that a public issue of securities requires disclosure
of information about the issuer, the rights associated with the securities, conditions of the offer,
and a comprehensive list of risks associated with the securities.180 Here, adequate disclosure is
the goal, and the SEC’s website notes that the goal is to empower investors, and not government
bureaucracy, to make informed financial decisions.181
If the sale in question involves a security, as defined by §2(a)(1), then registration is
required unless the transaction falls under one of the explicitly mentioned statutory exemptions
or if the SEC utilizes its general exemption powers given under §28.182
The registration requirement of §5 of the Securities Act is very broad. Technically, it
requires anyone, no matter how small, who sells, offers to sell or buy, a security, no matter how
small the transaction is, to register with the SEC. Fortunately, there are significant
exemptions.183
In 2005, the SEC reformed its offering rules to expedite the registration process, including
a relaxation for “Well Known Seasoned Offerors” and a provision allowing issuers to fulfill
prospectus delivery requirements by providing investors with a web link to an internet page
where the prospectus can be located.184
The registration process is divided into three periods: the prefiling period, the waiting
period, and the post-filing period.
During the prefiling period, all offers to sell or purchase the securities are barred. 185 This
is to prevent any offeror to precondition the market for the sale before the registration is filed.
An offer to sell is any communication reasonably calculated to generate a buying interest.186
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Generally, the definition of ‘offer or sale’ precludes preliminary negotiations with prospective
underwriters or underwriters in privity with the issuer. That said, loose communication with
underwriters can count as “jumping the gun”.
During the waiting period, the restrictions on offers to sell or purchase the securities are
lifted, but the issuer is still restricted from actually selling or taking steps towards the sale or
delivery of securities pursuant to a sale (as long as those steps utilize interstate commerce).187
Moreover, there are restrictions on the means used to solicit offers that remain throughout both
the waiting period and the post-effective period.188
During the post effective period—that is, once the registration becomes effective—sales are
permitted. However, restrictions still apply to the conditions of the sale, including that the
purchaser actually receives a prospectus.189
Liability Under the Securities Act
Section 11 of the Securities Act relates to the responsibilities of every signatory to the
registration statement, including the issuer, high level executives of the issuer (CEO, CAO,
CFO), directors of the issuer, experts (auditors), and the underwriter. It establishes a sliding
scale of liability, with the issuer being subject to the most strict version of liability for a misstatement, experts subjected to a reasonability standard, and non-experts merely required to
demonstrate that they had “no reasonable grounds” to believe, and did not in fact believe, that
the issuer’s statements were misleading190. Thus, the section implicitly utilizes a ‘gatekeeper’
model of securities regulation, by establishing liability to all of the parties involved, effectively
subjecting them to liability if they do not complete their analysis of the company with the standard of care required by their expertise and position. The establishment of liability in proportion
to a defendant’s expertise and intimacy with the issuer has led courts to utilize a cost-benefit
analysis vis-à-vis a potential defendant, essentially causing them to ask, was the defendant’s
conduct reasonable given the circumstances?191
Exchange Act of 1934
As noted above, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act operate in conjunction to
produce the regulatory mechanism for securities developed in response to the Great Depression.
While the Securities Act covers the sale of securities on the primary market, the Exchange Act
covers the sale of securities on the secondary market. As such and consistent with the general
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philosophy of disclosure, the primary consequence of registration is the requirement to submit
periodic reports to the commission.
Moreover, the Exchange Act also regulates the stock exchanges, such as the NYSE, and
the exchange’s primary SRO, FINRA, and other actors involved in the securities business, like
broker-dealers and banks that act as transfer agents.192
The primary purpose of the Exchange Act can be found in §3(f), which requires that the
SEC, when engaged in rulemaking or review of self-regulatory organizations under the
Exchange Act, must consider “whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.”193
Exemption powers
First, it is important to note that the SEC does have the authority to exempt any “person
security, or transaction, or any class of securities, or transactions” from any provision of the
Exchange Act (except for §15C which relates to government securities brokers and dealers)
given two conditions.194 First, that the exemption be necessary or appropriate in the public
interest. Second, that it be consistent with the protection of investors.195
Registration
The presence of either of two conditions will trigger registration requirements by an issuer
under the Exchange Act: 1) if the securities will be traded on an exchange196 or 2) if the issuer
is large enough in terms of asset size and number of shareholders.197 Upon registering, the
company becomes a “reporting company” and is thus subject to periodic reporting requirements
as well as to the other requirements in the Act.198
The purpose of disclosure is then effectuated in two ways through the Exchange Act.
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First, the initial registration under the Exchange Act must include certain disclosures. The
information disclosed for the registration under this Act and those required under the Securities
Act overlap often, although not entirely. However, the main consequence of the registration
under the Exchange Act is that it subjects the issuer to the periodic reporting requirements of
the Act.
Periodic Reporting Requirements
§13(a) requires registered issuers to comply with rules set forth by the SEC. Regulation 13A,
promulgated by the SEC, sets forth the required filings. The most important and common filings
are: Form 10-K (Annual Reports); Form 10-Q (Quarterly Reports, financial statements); and
Form 8-K: (reporting on materially important events).199
Technically, companies are required to report on materially significant events that are
specified by the statute, which is in contrast to the EU Market Abuse Directive, which requires
disclosure of events that may have a significant effect on prices. That said, the enumerated
events requiring an 8-K filing in the US law are so broad as to eliminate any practical difference
between the US and EU approach. In practice, US 8-K reports will often include every
potentially significant press release.200
These requirements are also related to insider trading since information reported through
the 8-k ought to be incorporated into the share price of the company, thereby erasing any
potential of insider trading.
Both 10-K and 10-Q reports are largely composed of Regulation S-K disclosure
requirements. Other sections of the Exchange Act require specific reporting requirements, such
as those pertaining to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.201
Liability Under the Exchange Act
Liability under the Exchange Act is usually predicated on the same rationale as liability
under the Securities Act. That is, liability stems from material misstatements or omissions. As
with the Securities Act, criminal prosecution can result in either a fine, imprisonment, or both.
However, Exchange Act criminal violations are more difficult to prove than violations of the
Securities Act because it requires a greater mens rea for conviction. The government must prove
that the defendant knew that the violated rule existed.
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Civil liability can be obtained either through §18 of the Exchange Act or through rule 10b-5
(promulgated pursuant to §10(b) of the Exchange Act).
§18 of the Exchange Act provides a private liability for losses resulting from
misstatements in documents filed with the SEC. However, liability under this section requires
the plaintiff to prove the following four facts: 1) she relied on defective filing when she
purchased or sold the security in question; 2) that the price was affected by the result of
defective filing (causation); 3) Good faith (and without knowledge) defense for D; 4) Courts
can require an undertaking and can assign costs to either party.
Over time, courts have imputed a private right of action for plaintiffs under 10-b-5 which
requires a lower burden of proof by the defendant.
10b-5 Liability
Both securities fraud and insider trading negatively impact the marketplace by giving an
informational advantage to a particular group of people. Fraud can obviously deter investment
in capital markets since it undermines investor trust. If investors perceive that insider trading is
commonplace, they may require a discount on the price of a security to cover the increased risk
that the person on the opposite side of the trade has superior knowledge about the actual value
of the security.
Rule 10(b)5, promulgated pursuant to §10(b) of the Exchange Act, is the most prominent
fraud claim as it deals with both material misrepresentations and omissions as well as insider
trading. The rule prohibits misrepresentations or omissions of material facts and fraudulent
behavior in connection with the sale or purchase of any security. Both criminal and civil
liabilities may result from its violation. Expectedly, then, most violations are pursued through
civil means, which have a lower scienter requirement.
The Court’s interpretation of the extent of Private enforcement of 10-b-5 violations has
changed over time. Although the statute itself does not contain a provision allowing a private
right of action for an individual, and was in fact likely intended to encourage public enforcement
by the SEC, the courts have clarified that a private right of action does exist for private plaintiffs
to bring a class action suit on the basis of a violation of §10(b)202 and SEC Rule 10(b)-5.203 That
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said, due to a fear of the “vexatiousness” of securities litigation (quoting the supreme court),
the private right of action for a §10(b)5 violation has been curtailed by both the courts and the
Congress.204 The Blue Chips decision itself applied a very narrow purchaser-seller requirement,
which required a potential plaintiff to have actually been a purchaser or seller of the security in
question in order to have standing.205 A plaintiff cannot simply claim that she would have
purchased or sold the security in question but for the misstatement or omission.206
Out of the professed belief that the US class action system applied to securities litigation
made the US stock market anticompetitive relative to foreign counterparts, Congress continued
the court’s narrowing of the private right of action under 10-b-5 by adopting the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which required a lead plaintiff, in the hopes that the
lead plaintiff would most likely be a financial institution, which could most effectively mitigate
the agency costs inherent in the US contingency fee civil litigation culture. It also significantly
heightened the pleading requirements and barred any plaintiff request for discovery until all
possible motions had been disposed of by the court.207 Additionally, the PLSRA limited the
liability in forward looking statements to situations where the defendant knew that the
information was false, as long as the statement is accompanied with boilerplate cautionary
language. Finally, it codified the “loss causation” requirement for damages, whereby the
plaintiff must prove the extent to which her loss resulted from the defendant’s conduct.
Additionally, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act in 1998,
which conferred exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts for class actions involving
misrepresentations or manipulative acts in the connection of a ‘covered security,’ which
includes securities listed on a national exchange as well as those that are privately placed.208
This act significantly curtailed private enforcement of securities laws through state courts.
Damages are awarded on a ‘loss causation’ basis, whereby plaintiffs must demonstrate
that they relied on the misstatement or omission and they must separate out the decline (or
increase) resulting from the misstatement or omission from that caused by general variations in
the stock that would have occurred even without the violation.
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Proxy solicitation
The Exchange Act also covers the requisite disclosure in proxy solicitations. During
annual or special meetings regarding corporate action, such as board member elections,
management or institutional investors often solicit proxy votes by sending information to
shareholders regarding the matter at hand.209 Since most shareholders will not attend, most
voting occurs though proxys, which effectively grants a shareholder’s votes to another. §14(a)
of the Exchange Act granted the SEC power to govern private conduct relating to proxy
solicitation in order to prevent fraudulent solicitation.210
Tender Offers and Takeovers
There is a considerable amount of debate about the economic desirability of takeovers in
general and thus, over how ameliorative the law should be towards them. Some free marketers
advocate a frictionless transfer of resources to their most valued uses. Others note that takeover
battles can be expensive and that corporate raiders can utilize their dispersion to take advantage
of the shareholders.
Tender offers, and the acquisition of blocks of shares, are regulated by the Williams Act,
which added various sections to the Exchange Act211.
§13(d) creates a filing requirement for any person amasses more than 5% of a class of
equity shares. Within 10 days of crossing that 5% threshold, the individual must file212 a
disclosure document with the issue, the SEC, and each exchange on which the stock is
traded.213,214
§ 14 (d) is the primary provision relating to tender offers. It places certain restrictions on
the types of tender offers that may be made if they will result in the offeror breaching the 5%
share ownership threshold and also contains a filing requirement to disclose information about
the tender offer as well as information about the bidder.215216 To satisfy the Rule, there is a
duration requirement (the bid must be held open for at least 20 days), an “all holders Rule”
which requires that the offer be open to all holders of that share of class on the same terms, a
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“best price rule,” which requires that the bidder pay the same amount to all those who accept
the offer, even if she decides to increase the offer after some have tendered217 There are other
requirements as well, but they all relate to similar goals.
Interestingly, here we see an instance of the SEC deviating from its usual disclosure
prescription in order to interfere with potential contractual arrangements between a potential
buyer and seller. This is likely a result of the dramatic asymmetric information and also the
strategic position of the raider vis-à-vis the class of shareholders who may succumb to a herd
mentality and accept the tender price. First, due to the dispersed nature of shareholder
ownership, corporate ‘raiders’ can strategically plan a tender offer in such a way so as to coerce
shareholders to accept even if they don’t believe that the transaction as a whole maximizes their
ownership rewards. The front loaded merger strategy in Unocal, for instance, was arguably
contrived so as to capitalize on a shareholder-herd mentality. If shareholders perceive a
likelihood that the raider will acquire a controlling stake through the cash offer, they may rush
to accept the cash offer rather than be forced, after the buyer obtains control, to accept arguably
less valuable consideration on the back end.
Enforcement Generally
Enforcement can be categorized into three distinct categories: 1) Administrative
(preventative and punitive), 2) Civil, and 3) Criminal.
Administrative (preventative)
Investigative Power
The Sec conducts over 1000 investigations per year, including regularly conducted
surprise investigations. The Enforcement Division recommends investigations and
recommends civil actions in federal court and also prosecutes these cases on behalf of the
commission.218 If the SEC receives indication that a Rule has been violated, it will generally
begin with an informal investigation that can be triggered by investors, whistleblowers from
within the company, or the general public. Similarly, an investigation can be triggered if the
SEC detects unusual stock price fluctuations that indicate potential insider trading violations.
Generally, the SEC will contact the potential violator and will invite them to respond to the
Commission in an informal statement.219
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To conduct an investigation, the Commission need only act in good faith—there is no
probable cause requirement. Since the investigations are “proceedings” within the meaning of
the federal obstruction of justice statute, both obstruction of justice charges and perjury charges
can be brought against witnesses. During formal investigations the SEC does have subpoena
powers to require witnesses to give testify. They also have the power to require a response from
the potential violator.
Often alleged wrongdoers will settle with the SEC, potentially accepting administrative
or injunctive remedies to avoid further proceedings. Ninety percent of cases are typically solved
in this manner.220 Although these settlements typically do not require the alleged wrongdoer to
admit guilt, they often include provisions that prevent the party from publicly denying the
allegations of the complaint.221222
If no settlement is made and the SEC determines that further action is warranted, it can
choose to implement either an administrative action or a civil action. It can also recommend
that the DOJ enact criminal prosecutions.
Administrative
Administrative actions are heard by an administrative law judge, who is independent of
the commission.223 The judge conducts a hearing, examines the available evidence presented by
the Enforcement Division staff as well as evidence from the alleged wrongdoer, will come to a
conclusion regarding law and fact, and will recommend the appropriate sanction. Either party
can appeal the initial decision to the five commissioners, which can affirm, reverse, or remand
for additional hearings.224 Finally, the target can bring an appeal to a US federal Court of
Appeals. All SEC administrative decisions are appealable by the target to the applicable US
federal Court of Appeals. Generally, these decisions will be subject to a deferential review, but
the amount of deference given to the administrative judge will depend upon the particular issue
at hand.
If the issue in the case is a question of the administrative entity’s interpretation of a statute,
the administration’s interpretation will be given “Chevron” deference. Chevron deference,
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which references a 1984 Supreme Court opinion, means that if a section of a statute is
ambiguous and Congress has not explicitly addressed the issue, then the court will side with the
interpretation of the administrative entity as long as that interpretation is reasonable.225
If the issue in the case concerns the factual conclusions that the administrative judge made
(e.g., the sufficiency of the evidence), the Court of Appeals will still apply deferential review.
That said, the precise wording of this standard may vary between the Courts of Appeals. The
9th Circuit, for instance, applies a “substantial evidence” standard, which is requires more than
a “scintilla of evidence”, but requires less than a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.226
An SEC decision to begin an investigation is not subject to any judicial review. 227 However,
the subject of a cease and desist order is subject to review by the court of appeals.228
Sanctions
There are a range of potential sanctions that can occur from an administrative proceeding.
Sanctions include injunctions (“cease and desist orders”) and other so-called ancillary relief
remedies that are based on principles of equity, which include suspension or revocation of
registrations necessary to work for public companies (bar), enhanced reporting requirements
for the violating company, a required appointment of an independent majority on the board of
the company or a specific corporate monitor, and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, where
investors that were harmed can receive at least some compensation.229
While the SEC has discretion over whether to impose a civil penalty, it may exercise that
discretion if it finds that the penalty is in the public interest and: the offender 1) willfully
violated the securities act, the investment company act, or the investment advisor act;
2) aided and abetted someone who violated one of those acts; 3) wilfully made a material
misstatement/omission in a report or filing; 4) failed to reasonably supervise someone who,
under his supervision, violated the act.230
The non-exhaustive set of factors the SEC is directed to consider when making this
decision are: 1) degree of culpability; 2) harm caused to others; 3) the extent to which unjust
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enrichment occurred; 4) past violations of securities or corporate laws; 4) the need to deter the
conduct in question.231 As with many multiple factor tests given by Congress, the list
demonstrates its non-exhaustive or open-ended nature with the last factor: “or other matters as
justice may require.”232
Civil (public)
With a civil action, the commission files a complaint with the U.S. District Court.
Appropriate sanctions can include injunctions, which, in addition to a prohibition of wrongful
activity can include mandatory auditing, accounting, or supervisory arrangements.233
Philosophy behind Private vs. Public Enforcement of Securities laws.
The SEC was granted civil enforcement powers from the outset of its inception and these
powers were greatly increased by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Although each Act does provide
criminal penalties for violations, the SEC is only authorized to bring civil claims against the
potential defendant.
Far more effective is the private enforcement of securities laws, especially through class
action lawsuits. The primary benefit of private litigation of securities laws is that it effectively
outsources regulatory costs to individual shareholders and lawyers. The primary professed costs
of widespread private enforcement come from the nature of the US civil litigation system—
most importantly, the contingent fee arrangement, which encourages potential plaintiffs to seek
out lawyers who will not receive any fee unless they win, and the American Rule system, which
requires each party to bear the costs of the litigation, including discovery costs, as opposed to
a ‘loser pays system’, under which losing party faces the costs of the opposing side. The
American system may encourage so-called ‘strike suits’, which are brought with no real
underlying evidence of misconduct only to force a company to settle in order to avoid the
litigation costs and the concomitant public relations costs or to force the company through an
expensive and vast discovery proceeding in the hopes of overturning some evidence of
misconduct, thereby increasing the potential reward of a settlement.234
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Criminal Liability for Willful Violations
The SEC, in addition to bringing civil lawsuits, can recommend that the Justice
Department bring criminal sanctions against an actor who violated securities law, although the
mens rea required for each offense can vary. There are many distinctions between a finding of
liability in a civil case and a finding of criminal wrongdoing. First, and most obviously, are that
the penalties associated with criminal liability are much stronger on the guilty individual.
However, there are other differences between the two, most notably related to the extent of
discovery and the burden of proof. For cases brought by the SEC in a civil action, both the
prosecutor and the defendant have the right to access a relatively large amount of information
related to the case. In a criminal proceeding, however, the discovery process is much more
restricted, both for the prosecutor and the defendant. Consequently, this produces interesting
strategic choices for both the SC and the defendant—the defendant, if she believes a criminal
prosecution may occur, may actually prefer to have the criminal suit brought first to avoid
divulging potentially incriminating evidence during the open civil discovery proceedings.
Conversely, a prosecutor may want to wait before she brings forth a criminal case in order for
the SEC to uncover more evidence and forward it to her.235 Finally, and the most important for
the purposes of this Paper, is the fact that a finding of criminal wrongdoing requires a much
higher burden of proof, which can be particularly difficult to meet in a securities action.
The mens rea requirements required for an offense under the Securities Act or the
Exchange Act has been the source of a considerable amount of both incoherence and discord,
largely due to the fact that both the Securities Act and Exchange Act were written before the
Model Penal Code rationalized and standardized mens rea concepts.236 Generally, the requisite
‘guilty mind’ for a criminal conviction is higher than that required for a finding of civil liability,
even if the underlying statute is the same.
Thus, requisite states of mind required for conviction—and for each of the individual
elements that compose the crime— have run the spectum from strict liability rules to specific
intent.
‘Willfully’ violating the Securities Act or making false or misleading statements about a
material fact is sufficient for criminal prosecution. The same is true for willfully violating the
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Exchange Act. But for false or misleading statements (or omissions) the required mens rea is
‘willful and knowing.’ Moreover, even a convicted defendant has a partial defense if he can
prove that he did not know of the act or rule in question.237
For securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5 the criminal mens rea is generally seen as
‘fraudulent intent’, whereas the civil mens rea requirement is ‘scienter.’
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Join Part
There is no doubt that the securities regulatory apparatus of both the US and Germany
share a great deal in common, both in principles and in implementation. In fact, this similarity
is somewhat deliberate. As we have seen in section A.I.3., Germany intentionally overhauled
their securities law in response to criticism from the SEC and out of a recognition that investors
require transparent capital markets with credible regulatory oversight.
Yet, comparative corporate governance should remind us that there is no ‘perfect
securities law’ for all places and at all times. Countries should take into account their own
particular context when searching for the ‘optimal’ regulatory structure. There are significant
underlying factors that might explain, and in fact rightly justify, divergences between the two
systems.
Most importantly, the two legal systems are built on fundamentally different foundations.
Common law legal systems may have strengths and weaknesses not shared by Civil law
systems, and vice-versa.
Second, Germany’s position within the EU clearly impacts its regulatory approach. While
many aspects of the US legal system is certainly complicated by its federalist structure, the
preemption of federal government law over state law in matters of interstate commerce allowed
it to quickly establish authority and compliance by the important players in the securities
market.
However, it seems generally recognized that the German and European system can
continue to improve by increasingly modeling their approach with a lens towards emulating US
law.
Summary of the similarities and differences.
Guiding Principles
Broadly speaking, there are two distinct interests served by securities law: the public and
the private interest. Efficient and functioning capital markets serve the public interest by
ensuring businesses easy and cheap access to capital which, in turn, aids overall economic
development. Private interests refer to the interests of the individual shareholders currently
trading in the market.
Both US and German capital market laws recognize the importance of investor protection
as a means of creating sustainable, broad and efficient capital markets. This is demonstrated by
the prevalence of disclosure requirements, both for primary issuers and for transactions on the
secondary market. Disclosure requirements allow, along with penalties for making
misstatements or ommissions of material facts, individual investors the confidence that they
41

can transparently weigh the true financial risks of the company in question. Both jurisdictions
require filing for primary issuers as well as periodic disclosures (Ad-Hoc Disclosure
requirements in the German context).
That said, in the German context investor protection is considered subordinate to the
primary goal of efficient and functioning capital markets, whereas in the US investor protection
is considered to be a goal, arguably even independent of its effect on the functioning of capital
markets. As a superficial matter, the importance the SEC places on investor protection is
demonstrated by the headline of the SEC’s ‘about us’ section in its website, which reads: “The
Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation.”238
This distinction is in part manifested in the relative extents to which monetary damages
accruing from civil infractions are apportioned to shareholders.
While both BaFin and the SEC can charge offenders pursuant to an administrative
proceeding, the SEC can also bring civil proceedings, pursuant to which it can require the
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains which can be placed in a “Fair Fund” for distribution to
investors who were victims.239, 240
More telling, however, is the prevalence of the US class action system. This mechanism
overcomes the traditional collective action problems facing dispersed shareholders and allows
for wronged shareholders to recoup—with the notable exception of attorney’s fees and court
costs—their provable losses resulting from the wrongdoing.
While arguably this private right of action mechanism enhances the public interest
through deterrence and is thus consistent with the German model whereby investor protection
is subordinate to the public interest, history belies that claim. As indicated in the brief history
of the 10(b)-5 private right of action analysis, the private right of action was not statutorily
intended and had its origins in tort principles of loss causation. Moreover, many commentators
have criticized the extensive use of private civil litigation as being detrimental to the public
interest and Congress itself has intentionally heightened the requirements for prevailing.241 This
suggests that, at the very least, US common law principles demand the individual right to
recuperation from harm as a normative value distinct from any public benefit resulting from
increased faith in capital markets integrity.
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How Securities Law is made
Securities law in the US comes ultimately from Congress’ power under the Constitution
to regulate interstate commerce. Stemming from the Exchange Act, the SEC is granted
regulatory powers as an independent regulatory commission with rule making power.242 The
latter shall be subject of a comparison to the German approach of rule making under the BaFin.
European Federalism versus United States
Harmonization remains an unattained goal in the EU, as there are significant differences
across the various Member States. The more important a difference is the more likely will be
an impediment influence from Member States in regard to rule making on the European level.
Even though the EU tries to converge with the Anglo-American system, national corporate
governance remains heterogeneous among the EU member states. Thus legislation on an
European level often – despite the improvements of Lamfalussy – a slow process.243
Given the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and its
imposition of that authority in the realm of securities law since the Great Depression,
heterogeneity among the states does not pose similar obstacles. As such, the rule making
process for the US is not nearly as complex as that required by the EU. Hence the primary point
of comparison must be at the regulatory institutional level—BaFin and the SEC.
General rule making power
In Germany, as mentioned in A. III., rule making in regard to securities regulation is a
multi-level complex due to European and German federalism. The BaFin itself is not entitled
to enact ordinances unless specifically mentioned in the WpHG. Thus the BaFin has no general
rule making power, but a specific rule making power.
Under the US Constitution it is prohibited to delegate rule making power from Congress
to an administrative agency according to the non delegation doctrine. Nonetheless legislative
agencies draft regulations much like congressionally enacted statutes. The new interpretation
of the non delegation doctrine states that there is no forbidden delegation of legislative power
if Congress provides for an ‘intelligible principle’, in other words a guiding principle to
administrative agencies. 244 Under §§ 10 (a) and (b) of the Exchange Act as well as § 3 (b) of
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the Security Act, the SEC has a general rule making power regarding rules and regulations ‘as
may be necessary to carry out the provision.’
As shown above, both the BaFin and the SEC have rule making power, but the nature of
that power is significantly different between the two. Administrative agencies in the US, like
the SEC, must receive their regulatory authority from Congress but do have a relatively large
amount of flexibility to interpret congressional statutes and to craft rules according to the
specific environment. The BaFin, on the other hand, must strictly comply with the wording of
the legislative delegation from the Department of Treasury and therefore lacks an equivalent
degree of interpretive flexibility. Moreover, the judicial analysis of regulatory interpretations
requires only that the regulatory agency applies a rational interpretation of the implementing
statute. The SEC has a rule making power that is delegated and only bound to a principle that
may be rather broad such as ‘public interest’.
The substantive distinction between the two legal regimes then, is that the US common
law system allows for a greater degree of institutional flexibility. This can have both positive
and negative effects. The primary benefit of flexibility is that it allows the SEC to quickly adapt
as it receives feedback from practitioners or as the economic or financial environment has
changed. However, there are drawbacks to the US approach. In the German system, regulators
operate much more like machines, with a defined set of rules regarding how to approach any
particular issue. The US system grants regulators with significant discretionary authority over
whether or not to enforce the rules or to interpret the rules in a narrow or broad manner.
Discretion is power, and this power creates two potential problems. First, that of regulatory
capture, whereby regulators consciously apply favorable approaches to companies in the tacit
expectation of gainful employment in the future. Second, the focus and strength of the SEC can
wax and wane depending upon the economic philosophies held by the President, who appoints
the commissioners. Although the system attempts to ensure bipartisan representation, the
aggressiveness of the SEC can vary greatly depending on the party in power. This conclusion
is underlined by the fact that the US law scholars have been discussing the danger of an agency
capture meaning that rule making participation of the subjects that are in the scope of the
agencies oversight is extended to an unhealthy degree due to lobbying.245
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Informal acts of administration
Rule making in Germany does not only include rules, regulations and ordinances as
shown in section A.III. 1.b) bb) (b) but also administrative informal acts. The SEC likewise
utilizes its ‘soft power’ to take advantage of its position as an industry standard setter through
the release interpretive releases, SEC policy Statements, and SEC Staff interpretations.246 ‘No
Action letters’ are particularly relied upon by the requesting companies although they too do
not carry the force of law.247
Obvious is that in both jurisdictions the attractiveness of rule making by using informal
means that have considerable consequences for market participants is high.
Given the discrepancies in the relative rule making power of both there must be some
intrinsic benefit to informal rule making that explains its use by both regimes. One possible
explanation is that the informal rule making approach affords a greater flexibility than either
regulatory regime has with its formal rule making process. Although the SEC rule making
process is, as explained above, more dynamic than BaFin’s, rule making still takes time and
there can be legal hurdles involved, even in the US system. If true, the extent of BaFin’s
influence as an industry standard setter through informal means may mitigate the limitations
imposed upon it by its relatively handcuffed position within the German legal apparatus by
enabling the agency to respond, albeit informally, in a dynamic fashion to rapidly changing
market conditions and upon the uncovering of new information and experience. The same
would, of course, be true for the SEC, but given its relatively flexible ability to amend
regulations the marginal beneficial effects of increased adaptability and case-by-case tailoring
resulting from the use of informal means may be smaller than those associated with the
corresponding ability of the BaFin.
Another benefit of the use of informal methods of regulation is transparency. By
publishing internal documentation, both agencies can explain their attitudes regarding the
implementation of a particular regulation ex-ante, and can also justify their actions ex-post,
each of which safeguards the agency’s reputation in the community it seeks to regulate and
enhances legal certainty.
Single Regulatory Authority (BaFin) vs. SEC
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Perhaps the biggest distinction between the agencies, aside from their different legal
contexts, is their respective degrees of institutional concentration.248
BaFin is based on the model of a “Universal Supervisor,” unifying securities, banking,
and insurance supervision under one roof and the supervision is organized on the basis of
business functions, not supervisory functions249, as is the case, for example, in the UK.250 (To
be clear, organizing on the basis of business functions means that the specific regulatory groups
are assigned to oversee the entire regulatory and supervisory process of certain types of
businesses). In the US these same responsibilities are shared between the SEC, the Fed,
Treasury, the FDIC, and others. As noted above, overall this amounts to over ten regulatory
bodies at the federal, state, and industry level.251 Even in the realm of securities law, the CFTC
and the SEC separately regulate, but in parallel, swaps and derivatives.252 Further complicating
the matter is the overlapping regulatory role that individual states play in all of these areas. In
fact, insurance regulation is left entirely to the states to regulate.253 Moreover, the US “twotiered structure” of its securities regulatory approach combines jointly the regulatory and
supervisory powers of the SEC with voluntary regulation by FINRA, ceding a degree of control
by the SEC (although, as noted above, the SEC does have significant control over FINRA). On
the other hand, this approach arguably enhances the flexibility of responses and the
communication between the public and private spheres, further enhancing the SEC’s
effectiveness.
Two factors that justified this aggregation of regulatory power under BaFin were the
emergence of universal banking in Germany and the consolidation of banks and insurance
companies into financial conglomerates254—the government wanted the regulatory agency to
mirror the size and scope of the conglomerates.255
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There are additional arguments concerning the costs and benefits of concentrated
regulatory powers under BaFin. First, a consolidated entity can take advantages of economies
of both scale and scope by efficiently utilizing a central resource allocation mechanism (the
benefits of synergy).256 Second, centralized planning systems, can increase the allocational
efficiency of regulatory resources. Third, an individual entity can more effectively harmonize
cultural and supervisory approaches and thus ensure the consistent treatment of regulated
entities.257
Some commentators fear that unifying so much responsibility in a single bureaucratic
entity can lead to the abuse of power, especially as members of the entity vie for greater
control.258 This is arguably less likely to occur in a segregated regulatory market place, since
the sharing of responsibilities necessitates communication and cooperation, both between
regulatory apparatuses themselves (as in the relationship between the SEC and the DOJ) and
between regulatory bodies and private sector leaders (as in the relationship between SEC and
FINRA). Even in the absence of cooperation between regulatory authorities, the US approach
arguably decreases the possibility of bureaucratic contagion, since overlapping regulatory
spheres ensures somewhat of a redundant regulatory system—that is, if one agency is
incompetent there are other agencies that may still be able to spot potential infractions.
However, this redundancy obviously also represents increased costs in the form of—well,
redundancies. It is a matter up for debate as to whether or not the benefits of the duplicative
scheme outweigh the costs.
Alternatively, the fragmented nature of US financial regulatory scheme can lead to
competition among the various US regulatory agencies that encourages each to become the
fiercest regulatory agency and therefore to have a tendency to overregulate, which can harm the
formation of capital markets by incentivizing managers and directors to expend resources to
avoid corporate or even personal liability.259
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Other concerns with the BaFin organizational structure have been the potential blurring
of the distinctions between financial institutions, cultural conflict within the entity since
employees have different specialties and different goals, and diseconomies of scale.260
Another potential advantage of having fragmented regulatory agencies is that they may
each compete for regulatory authority over new industries or financial products. If the system
functions rationally, the agency that is most capable and efficient should be given the
jurisdiction.261 However, as noted above, this competition could create a tendency towards over
regulation, both on the level of the individual regulator and in the sense that multiple agencies
will try to assert jurisdictional authority over the matter.
Overall, it is unclear which system is superior. And, as with nearly every other aspect of
this comparative analysis, the ideal organizational structure may be different for each country
given their legal and historical context. It is certainly clear that the US system imposes
significant burdens on companies—estimated in 2006 to be 15 times higher than the regulatory
burdens on British companies.262 But these differences in regulatory burdens may have more to
do with prevailing cultural attitudes among the regulators (i.e., whether they intellectually favor
a ‘hands off’ approach or a more aggressive regulatory stance) than with whether or not the
regulatory apparatus is fragmented or consolidated.

Enforcement of securities law
The US relies heavily on a deterrence approach towards capital markets regulation and
securities enforcement,263 as indicated by the SEC’s characterization as the “tough Cop on Wall
Street”.264 As shown in section B. VII. the US approach is based upon a wide variety of sanctions
as well as high enforcement intensity in order to achieve the deterrence. Enforcement intensity
can be measured by calculating the input of resources dedicated to enforcement relative to a
quantifiable output.265 Theoretically, the enforcement output should correlate with enforcement
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input—that is, expending a greater amount of resources towards enforcement ought to yield
more results. Regulatory costs in the US outnumber costs for regulation in Germany by far.
While the BaFin has a budget of approximately 262 million Euro in 2016, the SEC spends
approximately 1.722 billion US-Dollar (or 1.553 billion Euro). In 2012 the costs of regulatory
agencies compared to the market capitalization of the individual national stock markets were
52 % higher in the US than it was in Germany.266 Moreover, since BaFin serves as the regulatory
authority for banks and insurance companies as well as securities whereas the SEC only
regulates securities, the ratio US to German spending would be much higher if spending on
securities were isolated in the German budget. Data from 2002 and 2003 suggests that Germany
spent $3.914 per billion of Gross Domestic Product versus $131.731 the US towards security
regulation.
Administrative Enforcement
The SEC may initiate an Administrative Proceeding, an internal proceeding based on the
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Act 1990. In this case the SEC may issue a
variety of orders. The Cease and Desist Orders target individuals in charge of a breach of
securities law. Additional methods of administrative enforcement include monetary penalties,
disgorgement of illegal profits, temporary or final exclusion from the stock market trade, and
the so called stop order or refusal order, and may also issue officer and director bars. 267
Functionally, German equivalents exist for all sanctions mentioned above. However, officer
and director bars though only exist for financial institutions in Germany.
Another sanction common to both jurisdictions is public censure. According to the market
manipulation guideline, the BaFin may make breaches of securities law public once they are
incontestable; the sanction nonetheless is subject to harsh preconditions such as the
consideration of the constitutional right of informational self-determination.268 Additionally,
BaFin relies heavily on the practice of ‘corporate shaming.’
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The SEC may obtain a court order to restructure the board of managers or to appoint an
external authorized individual (a so called corporate monitor).269 A comparable institution may
only be found in the KWG and exclusively regarding financial institutions und the laws of the
KWG.
That the German armory is not as fierce also indicates the lack of certain powers such as
the power to seize evidence or to the power to freeze assets.270
The SEC conducts inspections and investigations. Inspections are not conducted by the
SEC branch in charge of enforcement thus inspection is considered a part of supervision.271
Formal investigations under the SEC include the subpoena power, which can compel the
production of evidence and can compel individuals to appear at a hearing.272 Moreover,
obstruction of justice charges and perjury charges can be brought against witnesses.
An important part of enforcement are intervention rights and the right to sanction, as
mentioned before in sections A III b) and B VII. While the US on this field have a two-tier
system of civil and administrative proceedings, the German securities regulator relies on a onetier system of administrative enforcement. The regulatory administration in the US may submit
a case to court while the SEC itself conducts administrative hearings. In Germany on the other
hand only the regulatory administration may sanction and intervene on the field of securities
regulation. The administrative court serves as a level of jurisdiction to grant legal protection
against unlawful sanctions and interventions.
As mentioned in section B VII 2 most cases that are under investigation of the SEC are
settled. Such a “Deal” or settlement as mentioned in section A III 3 b) does not exist in the
German securities regulation enforcement system of the BaFin.
Criminal Proceeding
Neither the SEC nor BaFin is able to conduct criminal proceedings on its own, but must
rely on the Department of Justice.273 Under the US Sarbanes/Oxley Act individuals face in a
case in which they are finally convicted a five-million-dollar penalty and a maximum of 25
years of imprisonment.274
Reflecting the fragmented nature of the US administrative system, the SEC has discretion
over whether or not they will recommend a case to the DOJ for prosecution. A crucial difference
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to the BaFin is the discretion of the SEC whether they forward a case in which there are
suspicious facts. This contradicts a real separation of powers between the different agencies on
the field of Criminal prosecution. The SEC has full discretion to forward evidence in ‘case’ to
the DOJ, which also has discretion as to whether or not they will bring a criminal prosecution.
Institutionally the DOJ is an entirely separate entity that brings criminal o prosecutions in a
variety of fields that are subject to regulatory supervision (e.g., Food and Drug violations). It
can also investigate in tandem with the SEC investigation.
The BaFin on the other hand has no discretion at all and must forward any suspicious
evidence to the criminal prosecutor that then decides with to bring a charge against the
regulation violator. This difference may be explained by a different principle of separation of
powers and different agency cultures in the different legal systems. Mergers of administrative,
judicial and legislative powers are considered to be a key factor for regulative excellence
nonetheless but are not, or only to a certain degree, compatible with constitutional law.275
From a comparative perspective it is opined that the US enforce their criminal law more
systematically.276
Private Enforcement
The SEC may initiate a Civil Injunctive Proceeding in addition or alternatively to its
administrative proceeding. Sanctions are very much comparable to the latter.
Administrative Enforcement in the US is also supplemented by a “hyperactive” system of
private enforcement. In fact, the private system appears to exact a greater annual aggregate
sanctions. The system relies on both class actions as well as entrepreneurial plaintiff’s bar
motivated contingent fees and has as such no functional counterpart in Germany.277
An approach to install a system to class action as explained in section A.III. 3. c), the so
called KapMuG, has not proven its efficiency to substantially supplement securities regulation
enforcement. Due to the explained ‘rational apathy’ a law suit under KapMuG is unattractive
and the lack of real a collective redress. In the US on the other hand victimized consumers
respectively investors with only small damages more often file a law suit collectively. The
opportunity of attorney fee shifting makes legal action more attractive to investors and serves
as an incentive to file a class action.278 Civil liability claims in the US on the other hand are
more often pursued. They again serve as preventive action for capital market fraud. Such claims
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do not appeal to possible plaintiffs or courts which reduces their frequency and hence their
repressive or preventive power.279
Punitive damages again do not exist in the German enforcement system and thus reduce
the deterrent effect of private enforcement and the attendance towards regulation compliance.
The same is true in regard to pre-trial discovery.
In section B II 4 self-regulatory organizations have been introduced. Aside from the Stock
market no self-regulatory organization exists in Germany. An institution such as the FINRA
has no analogue in Germany. To install such an agency is not debated. Especially on the field
of investor protection private investors remain self-responsible as for example Secretary of
Treasury Wolfgang Schäuble stated in 2014:’The mature citizen remains a mature citizen.’
Nonetheless BaFins powers may be extended in regard to collective consumer protection in the
near future.280
Public versus private enforcement from a cost benefit perspective
There has been a substantial amount of literature focusing on a cost-benefit analysis of
private litigation and public enforcement, with often mixed conclusions. Such mixed
conclusions are certainly understandable given the difficulty of cross country comparisons in
general alongside the difficulties in articulating the various legal and cultural nuances that affect
the actual application of seemingly similar laws in different jurisdictions.
Philosophically, there are two arguments in favoring public enforcement over private
enforcement.
First, whereas private enforcement focuses only on compensating the costs to the
plaintiff(s), public enforcement can consider the social costs of fraudulent activity, which is
primarily the inefficient allocation of capital caused both by the malinvestment in the offending
company and also by the decreased faith in the entire market system. Thus, public enforcement
penalties can be predicated on the principle that the private gains to be made from fraud should
be made less than the expected costs to a potential defendant. That is, public enforcement can
attempt to make the expected benefit from fraud less than the expected costs of fraud: personal
monetary and other punitive costs multiplied by the probability of punishment, requiring selfinterested actors to refrain from fraudulent behavior.
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Second, public enforcers have greater resources and greater investigative powers to utilize
in the detection and prosecution of fraudulent activity. Thus, public enforcement can take better
advantages of both economies of scale and scope in the deterrence of fraudulent behavior.281
Third, in a private-enforced civil litigation context, most jurisdictions, including the US,
require that the victim actually traded on the misleading information involved. This limits the
compensation disproportionately to investors who actively trade in the market. While this factor
also increases the discrepancy between private compensation and public welfare, as mentioned
in the first paragraph of this section, it also gives disproportionate gains to short-term traders
and thereby exacerbates any social costs associated with ‘short-termism’.
Fourth, if rational investors are adequately diversified, then there may be a decreased
incentive for investors to be concerned with fraud since their risk of fraud is dispersed among
many different investments. Since widely dispersed shareholders bear a relatively small amount
of the gains from litigation and bear a large portion of the costs, they may will be inadequately
incentivized to litigate.
Fifth, the ultimate defender is usually the corporation itself, and private actors within the
firm may be shielded from any personal liability in a civil context. In turn, it is the shareholders,
not the bad actors, who suffer from the fraudulent activity. Moreover, D&O insurance often
will indemnify corporate actors who engage in liability that brings forth civil action (although
D&O insurance normally precludes reimbursement from suits arising from intentionally
criminal activity).
However, there are arguments that question the validity of these arguments.
First, it is, as a practical matter, impossible to assess either the true social costs of
fraudulent activity since that measurement would need to calculate the monetary damages
associated with a general chilling effects on markets, often from the result of a single case of
bad behavior. Such costs are too difficult to calculate precisely, making any society wide costbenefit analysis untenable at best. Likewise, it is impossible to calculate the cost-benefit
analysis from the defendant’s perspective, and thus the appropriate punishment for effective
deterrence of a rational trader, since the overall level of bad behavior is unknown. That is, it is
impossible to calculate the likelihood of detection.
Second, although public agencies may appear to have greater resources, the accumulation
of the experiences and the information of the large numbers of private actors dwarfs the
information that public bodies can access. This is particularly true when public enforcers are
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responsible for the actions of a wide swath of companies. Moreover, public enforcers, although
they have a greater absolute amount of resources to implement a single case, do not have the
relative amount of resources to pursue all potential cases with the same level of rigor282.
Third, individuals involved in public enforcement are as susceptible to the same agency
costs as others who serve in a gatekeeper capacity through the ‘revolving door’ between public
agencies and private companies. That is, that public enforcers are incentivized to overlook
potential violations in companies for whom they may wish to work in the future.283
Additionally, political pressure from important companies could also be a source that deters
effective enforcement from public actors.
However, the use of class action has received substantial criticism in the United States
for promoting the use of frivolous lawsuits. Although they solve the collective action problem
inherent in single-individual private enforcement cases (that a single individual with a small
stake must bear all of the costs of litigation and share a small portion of the benefits), the process
in the US is largely lawyer driven. This can create two problems. First, that lawyers will be
likely to settle quickly even if a settlement is not in the interest of their class of clients. Second,
that lawyers, understanding the financial and reputational costs borne by companies facing
prolonged litigation, will seek to create illegitimate lawsuits in order to force a quick settlement
by the company.284
Conclusion
In conclusion it may be said that the US enforcement is administered by more actors especially
on the field of private enforcement. Sanctions available to the SEC as well as criminal
prosecutors are more deterrent focused. On the field of private enforcement self-regulatory
organizations such as FINRA guard the enforcement system as an independent private agency
with both preventive and repressive means. Criminal proceedings are conducted more
systematically in the US. On an administrative level enforcement shows considerable parallels
regarding intervention rights but eventually the SEC has more extensive powers on this field as
well.
In the end, much of the distinction between the two regulatory regimes is predicated on
historical accident. Although Germany, as well as much of the Eurozone, has attempted to
emulate the US regulatory model there are political and institutional reasons for why it cannot,
and should not, do so fully. Most importantly is Germany’s position within the EU and its legal
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infrastructure based on civil, not common law, which alters every regulatory approach the
government can make.
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